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Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48 Accounting for Uncertainty in 
Income Taxes (FIN 48) caused substantial change and controversy in the accounting and 
financial reporting for income taxes when it was released in 2006. This study utilizes a sample of 
public firms to examine the post-FIN 48 tax environment, focusing on tax aggressiveness. More 
specifically, this paper will (1) compare the tax aggressiveness of domestic and multinational 
firms, (2) investigate the relationship between tax aggressiveness and multinational size, as 
measured by the number of foreign jurisdictions, and (3) assess the overall quality of FIN 48-
related tax footnote disclosures provided by domestic and multinational firms, and consider their 
role in aggressive tax planning. The results suggest that multinationals are relatively more tax 
aggressive than domestic firms. Some evidence indicates that larger multinationals may be more 
tax aggressive than smaller multinationals. And lastly, the results supported a potential inverse 




Measuring Tax Aggressiveness after FIN 48: The Effect of Multinational Status, 
Multinational Size, and Disclosures 
 
I. Introduction: Overview of FIN 48 and Tax Aggressiveness 
This research measures the tax aggressiveness of domestic and multinational companies 
subsequent to the adoption of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation No. 
48 (FIN 48)1 in 2007. FIN 48 required the disclosure of information related to unrecognized tax 
benefits (UTBs) in the financial statement footnotes. Employing a sample of 47 firms, I assess 
whether domestic and multinational firms differ in tax aggressiveness, using multiple measures. I 
ask if multinational status, or the number of foreign jurisdictions the firm operates in, is 
associated with tax aggressiveness. I then examine the quality of each company’s tax disclosures 
to determine whether domestic and multinational firms have different disclosing policies, and 
consider if disclosures with less information are an indicator of aggressive tax planning. This 
research is important because it provides insight into how tax regulation (FIN 48) affects 
business practices.  
FIN 48 implemented a new two-step process to account for uncertain income taxes. In 
doing so, FASB intended to improve the overall quality of financial reporting by reducing the 
uncertainty and inconsistency of the (1) recognition and (2) measurement of tax benefits. For the 
recognition step, the firm considers whether the tax position is “more-likely-than-not” (>50%) to 
sustain an audit by the given tax authority (i.e. the Internal Revenue Service for U.S. companies). 
For the measurement step, the amount recognized should be the greatest benefit that is “more-
likely-than-not” to be realized upon settlement. The amounts failing to meet the 50% threshold 
are unrecognized tax benefits. Collectively, the UTBs constitute the tax reserve – a contingent 
liability that may become partly or entirely due if uncertain tax positions are successfully 
challenged by the IRS.  
FIN 48 also created several new disclosures that would require unprecedented 
transparency. It was this perceived vulnerability that led to a considerable amount of 
controversy. Many firms believed that the new disclosures, like the UTB tabular reconciliation, 
would help the IRS identify firms with uncertain tax positions. Thus, it would only be natural 
                                                          
1
 FASB Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Tax Positions—An Interpretation of FASB 
Statement No. 109 (June 2006) (now included in Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Subtopic 740-10). 
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that firms approach uncertain tax positions with caution in a post-FIN 48 world. In other words, 
the perceived risk of being audited could potentially cause a change in tax planning.  
Many scholars have questioned whether FIN 48 has actually led to a change in tax 
aggressiveness. One challenge to answering this question is due to a lack of a universally 
accepted definition and measurement of tax aggressiveness. Many sources define “aggressive tax 
planning” differently. For example, Chen et al states that aggressive tax planning is the 
“downward management of taxable income through tax planning activities” (2010, 1). Frischman 
et al defines it as “engaging in significant tax positions with relatively weak supporting facts” 
(2008, 265). Balakrishnan et al. states that aggressive tax planning is a strategy that results in an 
“unusually low amount of tax given the firm’s industry and size” (2011, 3). Other discussions 
provide more narrow definitions.  Overall, despite the particular definition used, aggressive tax 
planning should be recognized as a relative term.  
This research examines tax aggressiveness since FASB issued FIN 48. The fiscal year 
2007 was used for the purposes of this study because it was the first year FIN 48 became 
effective. My hypotheses are discussed in Section II. A discussion of the sample selection 
process and research design is given in Section III. Next, Section IV will state the results derived 
from this research. Finally, Section V concludes this study of tax aggressiveness. 
 
II. Description of Research Questions and Expectations 
A. Multinational vs. Domestic   
This study begins by investigating whether domestic or multinational status influences 
tax aggressiveness. Domestic companies appear to be at a disadvantage because the tax reserve 
relates to either U.S. or state uncertain tax positions.  Thus, the IRS may be more likely to pursue 
an audit if the tax reserve is large. On the contrary, uncertain tax positions for multinational firms 
will relate to issues in foreign jurisdictions, and as a result, the reserve is not as indicative of U.S. 
- related UTBs. Because the tax reserve disclosures of multinationals are less likely to be useful 
to the IRS, multinational firms may have a lower detection risk relative to domestic firms and 
potentially would be more willing to engage in more aggressive tax planning than domestic 
firms. My first hypothesis is as follows: 
 




B. Multinational Firm Size  
Next, I examine the relationship between multinational firm size, as measured by the 
number of foreign jurisdictions of the firm’s subsidiaries, and tax aggressiveness. The foreign 
subsidiaries are listed in Exhibit 21 Subsidiaries of the Registrant.  
Exhibit 21 Subsidiaries of the Registrant is required for all entities filing a 10-K. It 
provides a list of an entity’s “significant subsidiaries” and their corresponding jurisdictions. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission defines a significant subsidiary in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) as one that meets any of the three conditions: 
 
(1) The registrant's and its other subsidiaries' investments in and advances to the 
subsidiary exceed 10 percent of the total assets of the registrant and its 
subsidiaries consolidated as of the end of the most recently completed fiscal year 
(for a proposed business combination to be accounted for as a pooling of interests, 
this condition is also met when the number of common shares exchanged or to be 
exchanged by the registrant exceeds 10 percent of its total common shares 
outstanding at the date the combination is initiated); or (2) The registrant's and its 
other subsidiaries' proportionate share of the total assets (after intercompany 
eliminations) of the subsidiary exceeds 10 percent of the total assets of the 
registrants and its subsidiaries consolidated as of the end of the most recently 
completed fiscal year; or (3) The registrant's and its other subsidiaries' equity in 
the income from continuing operations before income taxes, extraordinary items 
and cumulative effect of a change in accounting principle of the subsidiary 
exceeds 10 percent of such income of the registrant and its subsidiaries 
consolidated for the most recently completed fiscal year. (17 CFR 210.1-02 (w)) 
 
The number of subsidiary jurisdictions listed in Exhibit 21 gauges the physical extent of 
the company’s operations, and thus may correspond to its ability to take aggressive uncertain tax 
positions.2 My second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: Larger multinational firms are more tax aggressive than smaller multinational firms. 
                                                          
2
 Initially, I thought I could use Exhibit 21 as an indication of a firm’s disclosing behavior, and ultimately relate 
it to tax aggressiveness. But after reviewing the Exhibit 21 disclosures, it became evident that the firms were 
disclosing all of their subsidiaries. This was unusual because the SEC only requires that a firm disclose its 
“significant” subsidiaries (see above for a definition of a significant subsidiary). Because all of the firms were 
exercising complete voluntary disclosure, I decided that Exhibit 21 was not an appropriate tool for comparing tax 
aggressiveness in this study. Instead I decided to use the number of jurisdictions as a measure of size, as discussed 
above. Moreover, I verified my jurisdiction count with the Dyreng dataset’s count of foreign jurisdictions to 
determine the reliability of the data to be used.  
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C. Disclosure Quality   
FIN 48, now codified as ASC 740-10-50-15 and 50-15A, requires four annual disclosures 
with respect to UTBs. For public entities for each annual reporting period, ASC 740-10-50-
15A(a) and (b) requires firms to disclose (1) a tabular reconciliation of the total UTBs at the 
beginning and end of the period and (2) the total UTBs that, if recognized, would affect the 
effective tax rate. Two additional disclosures are required from all firms, public and private. 
ASC 740-10-50-15 (c) and (d)3 requires firms to disclose (3) the amount of interest and penalties 
recognized in the income statement and balance sheet, and (4) the UTBs that are reasonably 
expected to significantly increase or decrease within 12 months of the reporting date.4 
In addition, firms are now required to provide “A description of tax years that remain 
subject to examination by major tax jurisdictions” (ASC 740-10-50-15(e)). The term “major” is 
not defined by FASB or the SEC. The codification contains a sample disclosure: 
The Company or one of its subsidiaries files income tax returns in the U.S. federal 
jurisdiction, and various states and foreign jurisdictions. With few exceptions, the 
Company is no longer subject to U.S. federal, state and local, or non-U.S. income 
tax examinations by tax authorities for years before 20X1. The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) commenced an examination of the Company’s U.S. income tax 
returns for 20X2 through 20X4 in the first quarter of 20X7 that is anticipated to 
be completed by the end of 20X8. (ASC 740-10-55-217) 
 
Considering this example, it appears that “federal,” “state,” and “foreign” are the minimum 
requirements in terms of disclosing major tax jurisdictions. Specific years for each grouping of 
jurisdictions also are not mandatory; instead, the sample reads: “with few exceptions… no longer 
subject to… examination by tax authorities before...”  
After reviewing the required disclosures, firms have an opportunity to provide expanded 
voluntary disclosures in terms of foreign jurisdictions and open tax years. In the end, five distinct 
disclosure categories emerged from the sample being studied. These classifications are described 
in Section III below.   
                                                          
3
 ASC 740-10-50-15(a) and (b) relating to the tabular reconciliation and disclosure of UTB_ETR were 
intentionally left out of this listing because they have been superseded by Accounting Standards Update 2009-06, 
which has been incorporated into ASC 740. 
4
 In particular, a company must disclose the nature of the uncertainty, the event that could trigger the significant 
change, and either an estimated range of the reasonably possible change in unrecognized tax benefits or a statement 
acknowledging that an estimate cannot be made. For example, the expiration of the statute of limitations or the 
occurrence of other events, such as the closure of a tax examination within the next 12 months, could have a 
significant effect on UTBs. 
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Using a sample of 47 firms selected by my thesis advisor, I hand-collected the tax 
footnote information related to FIN 48 disclosures. It is evident that some firms disclose more 
information than others. The different levels of quality observed raised questions: Why are firms 
choosing to voluntarily disclose information? How does disclosure quality relate to aggressive 
tax planning? My third hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3: Firms with voluntary tax disclosures are less tax aggressive than firms with minimal 
tax disclosures. 
 
III. Sample Selection and Research Design 
A. Sample Selection 
The study sample originally consisted of 58 domestic and multinational public firms 
selected by my thesis advisor. Companies filing Form 20-F, required by certain “foreign private 
issuers,” were removed from the sample because they do not have to file an Exhibit 21. Certain 
spin-off companies were also removed because they lacked historical data. The resulting sample 
consisted of 10 domestic firms and 37 multinational firms. In considering the data, I recognize 
that there are several limitations: (1) the sample is limited in size, and (2) there is more data 
provided for multinationals than domestic firms. 
B. Tax Aggressiveness Variables 
As discussed in the introduction, the lack of a universally applied measurement for 
aggressive tax planning created a challenge for this study.5 This study employs the following 
variables to measure aggressive tax planning: cash effective tax rate (CashETR), long-term cash 
effective tax rate (LRCashETR), total book-tax difference (BTD), permanent book-tax 
differences (PBTD), unrecognized tax benefits (UTB), and current year tax reserve increase 
(CYINCR). Table 1 provides definitions for these variables. With the exception of the final two, 
these variables were calculated using data collected from Compustat. UTBs were obtained from 
IRS data that my thesis advisor is using in a UTB study. 
The effective tax rate (ETR), defined as some measure tax liability over income, is a 
common measure used in the accounting profession for tax planning. Two variations are used for 
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the purposes of this study – CashETR and LRCashETR. The CashETR utilizes the taxes paid by 
the firm over pre-tax book income. The LRCashETR provides a more stable measure than 
CashETR, and serves as a reinforcing measurement.   
BTD is another common proxy for tax aggressiveness. This is computed as the difference 
between book and taxable income. Estimating taxable income is typically accomplished by 
grossing up current tax expense using the statutory rate. Some evidence suggests that BTDs are 
positively associated with tax shelters (Wilson 2009). Other studies suggest that PBTDs in 
particular are a good measure for aggressive tax planning. This is based on the assumption that 
managers prefer tax strategies that reduce income tax expense. Favorable PBTDs reduce current 
income tax expense without a change in deferred taxes. On the other hand, a favorable temporary 
BTD will reduce current tax expense, but increase deferred tax expense – resulting in no change 
in total income tax expense.  
UTBs are associated with uncertain tax positions. Firms with more aggressive tax 
planning may have more uncertain tax positions than conservative firms, which suggests a direct 
relationship exists between reserve size and tax aggressiveness. In support, Lisowsky et al. 
(2011) finds evidence of a positive relation between year-end balance of the tax reserve and tax 
sheltering. Similarly, the CYINCR in the tax reserve provides a measure of aggressive regarding 
the firm’s current tax planning strategies. 
 
See Table 1 
 
C. Tax Disclosure Variables 
Multinational Status.  I determined that a firm was multinational if the firm listed 
foreign subsidiaries on Exhibit 21 (Status = yes if foreign subsidiaries listed on Exhibit 21). My 
sample has 10 domestic firms and 37 multinational firms. 
Multinational Firm Size. I created the Size variable by counting the number of foreign 
jurisdictions per Exhibit 21. Table 2 provides the frequency distribution used to determine the 
midpoint of foreign jurisdictions to distinguish small from large multinational firms.  A firm is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5
 Other variables were available to use besides those chosen (see Table 1). These variables could have been 
equally appropriate or perhaps even better measures of tax aggressiveness. One variable I had considered using, but 
ultimately rejected in favor of more common measures, was tax havens. 
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“small” if it has less than or equal to 13 foreign countries for the purposes of this study. A 
“large” multinational firm has more than 13 foreign jurisdictions. 
 
See Table 2 
 
Country Count. I created the CountryCount variable based on the information provided 
in the 10-K tax footnote. Some firms disclosed the closed foreign tax years for each foreign 
country. I counted the number of foreign countries listed.  
Table 3 provides the Country Count for multinational firms. Of the 37 multinational 
firms, 20 firms did not disclose any specific foreign jurisdiction. This indicates that most firms 
provide limited information about foreign tax status. 
 
See Table 3 
 
Disclosures. I created the Disclosure variable based on the information provided in the 
10-K tax footnote, including U.S. years under audit, and closed U.S. tax years. 
My five classifications are as follows: 
Disclosures applying to multinationals: 
M0 The disclosure met the minimum FIN 48 requirements. The major tax jurisdictions 
are only defined as “federal,” “state,” and “foreign.” The firms in this category do 
not provide names to specific foreign countries or years. 
M1 In addition to the minimum requirements, the disclosure provides information 
about open tax years.  
M2 In addition to the minimum requirements, the disclosure includes the names of 
specific foreign countries and/or states, as well as information concerning open tax 
years.  
Disclosure applying to domestic firms: 
D1 The disclosure met the minimum FIN 48 requirements by listing “federal” and 
“state” as their major jurisdictions, but no further details. 
D2 In addition to the minimum requirements, the disclosure lists specific states.  
 
Table 4, Panel A, provides examples of the types of disclosures. Table 4, Panel B, shows 
how many domestic and multinational firms provided each type of disclosure. There is an 
increasing trend in the number of multinational firms providing more informative disclosures. 
Approximately 21.6% (8/37) of firms provided the minimum requirements according to FIN 48, 
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32.4% (12/37) chose to augment their footnotes by adding open tax years, and 46% (17/37) 
voluntarily disclosed specific jurisdictions and years. Based on this information, a large portion 
of multinationals provide higher quality disclosures. Domestic firms are split between the basic 
and voluntary disclosure types. 
 
See Table 4 
 
IV. Results 
Domestic vs. Multinationals. I hypothesize that multinational firms are more tax 
aggressive than domestic firms (H1). Table 5 compares tax aggressiveness for domestic and 
multinational firms using the means of the tax aggressiveness variables. The t-statistic was 
computed to determine the significance of the difference between these means. Those mean 
differences for which the t-statistic was greater than positive or negative 2.00 were considered to 
be statistically significant. The mean differences for CashETR, LRCashETR, BTD and PBTD 
did not meet the t-statistic threshold. However, the UTB and CYINCR differences are 
statistically significant; the multinationals showed overall larger tax reserves and current year 
increases. All in all, there is some support for my hypothesis that multinational firms are more 
tax aggressive than domestic firms. 
 
See Table 5 
 
 I hypothesize that larger multinational firms are more tax aggressive than smaller 
multinational firms (H2). Table 6 provides a comparison of small and large multinational firm 
tax aggressiveness. CashETR was statistically significant, but did not support my hypothesis that 
large multinational firms had more tax aggressive planning. LRCashETR, BTD, and PBD mean 
differences were did not meet the t-statistic threshold for significance. But the UTB and 
CYINCR mean differences were statistically significant, and did support my hypothesis.  
 




Disclosures. I hypothesize that firms with voluntary tax disclosures are less tax 
aggressive than firms with minimal tax disclosures (H3). Table 7 examines the tax 
aggressiveness associated with each disclosure type for multinational firms. The mean 
differences for CashETR and LRCashETR increase as the quality of disclosure increases from 
type M0 to M2.  These measures are statistically significant, and support my hypothesis that 
more tax aggressive firms provide less informative footnotes. BTD and PBTD were also 
significant. The BTD and PBTD measures were greater overall for firms with lower levels of 
disclosure, demonstrating that they may be more tax aggressive. The UTB and CYINCR mean 
differences were statistically insignificant.     
 
See Table 7 
 
The same information was compiled for the domestic disclosures (D1 and D2). However, 
there were no significant differences based on type of disclosure. This result suggests that 
informative disclosures may not be an indicator of tax aggressiveness for domestic firms. 
 
V. Conclusion 
My results suggest that multinational and domestic firms behave differently in a post-FIN 
48 tax environment. My first hypothesis that multinational firms may be more aggressive than 
domestic firms was supported by some evidence. In this case, the UTB and CYINCR variables 
seemed to be more useful for measuring tax aggressiveness. The results concerning my second 
hypothesis, comparing multinational firm size and tax aggressive planning, were also mixed. 
Again, the UTB and CYINCR variables were significant and supported my hypothesis. The 
CashETR measure was interesting because it was statistically significant, but contradicted my 
hypothesis. Because the median was not dramatically different from the mean, this result was not 
likely to have been caused by an outlier. Further research or a larger sample would be necessary 
to examine the source of this relationship and to determine whether a revision of my hypothesis 
would be appropriate.  
Lastly, my research did provide some support for my third hypothesis. For 
multinationals, it appeared as though there was an inverse relationship between disclosure 
quality and tax aggressiveness, as expected. The CashETR, LRCashETR, BTD, and PBTD 
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variables all provided significant support in this case. On the contrary, the results as a whole for 
domestic disclosures were not significant. This may be because tax aggressiveness is not related 
to disclosure quality for domestic firms. Otherwise, the results may have been affected by the 
sample size, and a larger sample would be necessary. 
The results of my research suggest the need for further investigation into the subject. 
Employing additional variables may be particularly helpful in cases where mixed results were 
found. Given more time, I would have liked to expand the sample to include more firms. The 
domestic dataset ended up being particularly narrow and this places limitations on the study’s 
results. Increasing the scope of the sample would have provided a broader and more accurate 










Tax Aggressiveness Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
CashETR The cash effective tax rate calculated as cash taxes paid (TXPD) in year t divided by 
pre-tax book income in year t (PI) less special items (SPI); 
LRCashETR The five year average cash effective tax rate calculated as the five year sum of  
cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by the five-year sum of pre-tax book income (PI) 
less special items 
(SPI); 
BTD Total book tax differences computed as the difference between book income (PI) 
less minority interest (MII) and an estimate of taxable income. Taxable income is estimated 
by grossing up the sum of federal tax expense (TXFED) and foreign tax expense (TXFO)  
by the statutory rate and then subtracting the change in the net operating loss (TCLF) from  
year t-1 to year 1. BTD is scaled by beginning of the year total assets (AT); 
PBTD Permanent book tax differences computed as the difference between total 
book tax differences (BTD) and temporary book tax differences [Computed by grossing  
up deferred tax expense (DTE) by the statutory rate]; 
   
UTB  Unrecognized tax benefits, more commonly known as the tax reserve for uncertain tax positions;  
  






Current year addition to the tax reserve; this amount is divided by total assets at the beginning of  
the year (AT) 
   









Small versus Large Multinational Firms 
 
ncountries Frequency % Cum. % 
1 1 2.78 2.78 
2 3 8.33 11.11 
3 2 5.56 16.67 
5 1 2.78 19.44 
6 1 2.78 22.22 
7 3 8.33 30.56 
8 1 2.78 33.33 
9 1 2.78 36.11 
11 1 2.78 38.89 
13 3 8.33 47.22 
18 3 8.33 55.56 
23 2 5.56 61.11 
25 1 2.78 63.89 
27 1 2.78 66.67 
32 1 2.78 69.44 
33 1 2.78 72.22 
37 1 2.78 75 
38 1 2.78 77.78 
40 1 2.78 80.56 
41 1 2.78 83.33 
44 1 2.78 86.11 
49 1 2.78 88.89 
59 1 2.78 91.67 
64 1 2.78 94.44 
81 1 2.78 97.22 
110 1 2.78 100 
        
Total 36 100   
 
  
Ncountries refers to number of foreign jurisdictions represented on Exhibit 21. 
Ncountries<=13 are small.  








Number of Foreign Countries Listed in 10-K Tax Footnotes (Country Count) 
Country Count 
Multinational Status 
   
Total No Yes 
0 10 20 30 
1  1 1 
2  3 3 
3  4 4 
4  3 3 
5  2 2 
6  1 1 
9  1 1 
11  2 2 









Panel A, Examples of Disclosures 
Disclosures applying to multinationals: 
M0 The disclosure met the minimum FIN 48 requirements. The major tax jurisdictions 
are only defined as “federal,” “state,” and “foreign.” The firms in this category do 
not provide names to specific foreign countries or years. 
M1 In addition to the minimum requirements, the disclosure provides information about 
open tax years. An example of an M1 disclosure:  
We file a U.S. federal income tax return and income tax returns in 
various states and foreign jurisdictions. With few exceptions, we are no 
longer subject to income tax examinations for years before 1998 (Target 
Corp). 
 
M2 In addition to the minimum requirements, the disclosure includes the names of 
specific foreign countries and/or states, as well as information concerning open tax 
years. An example a 2007 M2 disclosure: 
We conduct business globally and, as a result, UTC or one or more of 
our subsidiaries file income tax returns in the U.S. federal jurisdiction 
and various state and foreign jurisdictions. In the normal course of 
business, we are subject to examination by taxing authorities 
throughout the world, including such major jurisdictions as Australia, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. With few 
exceptions, we are no longer subject to U.S. federal, state and local, or 
non-U.S. income tax examinations for years before 1998 (United 
Technologies Corp). 
Disclosure applying to domestic firms: 
D1 The disclosure met the minimum FIN 48 requirements by listing “federal” and 
“state” as their major jurisdictions, but no further details. 
D2 In addition to the minimum requirements, the disclosure lists specific states. An 
example of a D2 disclosure: 
The Company has identified its federal tax return and its state tax 
returns in California and Texas as “major” tax jurisdictions, as 
defined. The only periods subject to examination for the Company’s 
federal tax returns are the 2005 and 2006 tax years. The periods 
subject to examination for the Company’s state tax returns in 






Table 4 (cont’d) 
 





N Y Total 
M0  8 8 
M1  12 12 
M2  17 17 
D1 5  5 
D2 5  5 






Domestic versus Multinational Tax Aggressiveness 
 
Variable N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 Diff t-statistic 
Domestic                 
CashETR 9 0.366 0.277 0.287 0.344 0.425 0.111 1.86 
LRCashETR 8 0.228 0.109 0.154 0.248 0.305 -0.007 -0.18 
BTD 9 0.015 0.022 0.001 0.007 0.02 -0.015 -0.87 
PBTD 9 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.011 -0.022 -1.52 
UTB  9 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.006 -0.012* -2.44 
CYINCR 9 0 0.001 0 0 0 -0.002* -2.43 
              
  
  
Multinational                 
CashETR 34 0.255 0.114 0.184 0.275 0.339     
LRCashETR 26 0.235 0.089 0.183 0.228 0.304     
BTD 35 0.031 0.051 0.008 0.025 0.041     
PBTD 35 0.027 0.043 0.002 0.017 0.052     
UTB 37 0.017 0.014 0.007 0.014 0.023     
CYINCR 34 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003     
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
N is the number of firms for which data was collected. 
SD is the standard deviation. 
Diff is the difference between means. 





Table 6  




See Table 2 for definition of small and large firm size. 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
N is the number of firms for which data was collected. 
SD is the standard deviation. 
Diff is the difference between means. 




Size Variable N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 Diff. t-statistic 
Small CashETR 16 0.209 0.127 0.115 0.242 0.308 -0.0887* (-2.36) 
  
LRCashETR 12 0.22 0.113 0.165 0.227 0.303 -0.0297 (-0.81) 
  
BTD 16 0.036 0.068 0.009 0.027 0.042 0.0108 0.6 
  
PBTD 16 0.023 0.053 -0.001 0.012 0.035 -0.00784 (-0.51) 
  
UTB 17 0.011 0.014 0.004 0.008 0.013 -0.0110* (-2.51) 
  
CYINCR 15 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.002 -0.0021** (-2.75) 
  
                  
Large CashETR 17 0.297 0.086 0.248 0.309 0.346     
  
LRCashETR 13 0.249 0.066 0.188 0.271 0.304     
  
Total BTD 18 0.025 0.032 0.008 0.021 0.041     
  
PBTD 18 0.031 0.036 0.005 0.026 0.056     
  
UTB  19 0.022 0.012 0.015 0.021 0.031     
  




Multinational Disclosures and Tax Aggressiveness 
 
Disclosure 
Type Variable N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 Diff. t-statistic 
                    
M0 CashETR 8 0.138 0.099 0.053 0.15 0.213 -0.184*** (-4.99) 
  LRCashETR 5 0.116 0.08 0.067 0.146 0.183 -0.163*** (-4.26) 
  BTD 8 0.072 0.075 0.024 0.033 0.106 0.0634* 2.69 
  PBTD 8 0.052 0.055 0.008 0.037 0.106 0.0424* 2.16 
  UTB 8 0.018 0.019 0.007 0.011 0.023 0.00265 0.48 
  CYINCR 7 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000941 0.9 
                    
M2 CashETR 14 0.321 0.073 0.294 0.323 0.349     
  LRCashETR 11 0.279 0.067 0.211 0.304 0.336     
  BTD 15 0.008 0.04 -0.018 0.012 0.029     
  PBTD 15 0.01 0.039 -0.008 0.009 0.034     
  UTB 17 0.015 0.009 0.006 0.016 0.021     
  CYINCR 16 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002     
See Table 4 for definition of disclosure MO and M2. 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
N is the number of firms for which data was collected. 
SD is the standard deviation. 
Diff is the difference between means. 
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